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Abstract—IoT devices are increasingly deployed in daily life.
Many of these devices are, however, vulnerable due to insecure
design, implementation, and configuration. As a result, many
networks already have vulnerable IoT devices that are easy
to compromise. This has led to a new category of malware
specifically targeting IoT devices. However, existing intrusion
detection techniques are not effective in detecting compromised
IoT devices given the massive scale of the problem in terms of the
number of different types of devices and manufacturers involved.
In this paper, we present DI¨OT, an autonomous self-learning
distributed system for detecting compromised IoT devices. DI¨OT
builds effectively on device-type-specific communication profiles
without human intervention nor labeled data that are subse-
quently used to detect anomalous deviations in devices’ commu-
nication behavior, potentially caused by malicious adversaries.
DI¨OT utilizes a federated learning approach for aggregating
behavior profiles efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, it
is the first system to employ a federated learning approach
to anomaly-detection-based intrusion detection. Consequently,
DI¨OT can cope with emerging new and unknown attacks. We
systematically and extensively evaluated more than 30 off-the-
shelf IoT devices over a long term and show that DI¨OT is
highly effective (95.6% detection rate) and fast (≈ 257ms) at
detecting devices compromised by, for instance, the infamous
Mirai malware. DI¨OT reported no false alarms when evaluated
in a real-world smart home deployment setting.
Index Terms—Internet of Things; IoT security; IoT malware;
anomaly detection; federated deep learning; self-learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Many new device manufacturers are entering the IoT device
market, bringing out products at an ever-increasing pace.
This “rush-to-market” mentality of some manufacturers
has led to poor product design practices in which security
considerations often remain merely an afterthought.
Consequently, many devices are released with inherent
security vulnerabilities that can be exploited, which has led
to an entirely new category of malware explicitly targeting
IoT devices [1]–[4].
The preferred way to cope with vulnerabilities are security
patches for the affected devices [5]. However, many devices
lack appropriate facilities for automated updates or there
may be significant delays until device manufacturers provide
them, mandating the use of reactive security measures like
intrusion detection systems (IDS) for detecting possible device
compromise [6]–[9].
Signature-based IDSs look for specific communication pat-
terns, so-called attack signatures, associated with known at-
tacks. Such systems are, however, unable to detect novel
attacks until the IDS vendor releases attack signatures for
them [6].
To detect previously unknown attacks anomaly detection
needs to be used which works by profiling the normal behavior
of devices and detecting attacks as deviations from this normal
behavior profile [7]–[9]. However, this approach often suffers
from a high false alarm rate, making it unusable in practice.
This problem is exacerbated in the IoT setting: First, there
are hundreds of very heterogeneous devices on the market,
which making it challenging to train a precise detection model
covering all behaviors of various IoT devices.
Second, IoT devices do
typically not (notwithstanding a few exceptions) generate
a lot of network traffic, as their communications are limited
to, e.g., status updates about sensor readings or (relatively)
infrequent interactions related to user commands. This scarcity
of communications makes it challenging to train comprehen-
sive models that can accurately cover the full behavior of IoT
devices.
An effective anomaly detection model needs to capture all
benign patterns of behavior to be able to differentiate them
from malicious actions. The ever-increasing number of literally
thousands of types of IoT devices (ranging from temperature
sensors and smart light bulbs to big appliances like washing
machines) and the typical scarcity of their communications,
makes an all-encompassing behavior model 1) tedious to learn
and update, and 2) too broad to be effective at detecting subtle
anomalies without generating many false alarms.
Goals and Contributions. To tackle the above challenges
we present DI¨OT, a system for detecting compromised IoT
devices.
It uses
a novel device-type-specific anomaly detection approach to
achieve accurate detection of attacks while generating almost
no false alarms. Major IoT device vendors, including Cisco,
assisted us formulating real-world settings for our solution and
usage scenarios.
We make the following contributions:
• DI¨OT, a self-learning distributed system for security
monitoring of IoT devices (Sect. II) based on device-type-
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specific detection models for detecting anomalous device
behavior:
– It utilizes a novel anomaly detection approach based
on representing network packets as symbols in a lan-
guage allowing to use a language analysis technique to
effectively detect anomalies (Sect. III).
– It is the first system to apply a federated learning
approach for aggregating anomaly-detection profiles
for intrusion detection (Sect. IV).
• Systematic and extensive experimental analysis using
more than 30 off-the-shelf IoT devices, showing that
DI¨OT is fast (detection in ≈257ms) and effective (95.6%
true positive rate, zero false alarms, i.e., 0% false positive
rate) (Sect. VI).
• An Attack dataset of network traffic generated by real
off-the-shelf consumer IoT devices infected with real
IoT malware (Mirai [1]) using which we evaluate the
effectiveness of DI¨OT (Sect. V-A).
We will make our datasets as well as the DI¨OT implemen-
tation available for research use.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our system model is shown in Fig. 1. We consider a
typical SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) network, where IoT
devices connect to the Internet via an access gateway.
A. System Architecture
The DI¨OT system consists of Security Gateway and IoT
Security Service. The role of Security Gateway is to monitor
devices and perform anomaly detection in order to identify
compromised devices in the network. It is supported by IoT
Security Service, which can be, e.g., a service provider like
Microsoft, Amazon or Google that aggregates device-type-
specific anomaly detection models trained by all Security
Gateways in the system.
1) Security Gateway: acts as the local access gateway to the
Internet to which IoT devices connect over WiFi or Ethernet. It
hosts the Anomaly Detection component. When a new device
is added to the network, Security Gateway identifies its type
as outlined in Sect. II-C. The Anomaly Detection component
monitors the communications of identified IoT devices and
detects abnormal communication behavior that is potentially
caused by malware (Sect. III) based on anomaly detection
models it trains locally and which are aggregated by the IoT
Security Service to a global detection model.
2) IoT Security Service: supports Security Gateway by
maintaining a repository of device-type-specific anomaly de-
tection models. When a new device is added to the local
network, Security Gateway identifies its device type and re-
trieves the corresponding anomaly detection model for this
type from IoT Security Service. IoT Security Service also
aggregates updates to device-type-specific anomaly detection
models provided by the Security Gateways in the system.
B. Adversary Model and Assumptions
Adversary. The adversary is IoT malware performing at-
tacks against, or launching attacks from, vulnerable devices in
the SOHO network. Hereby we consider all actions undertaken
by the malware that it performs to discover, infect and exploit
vulnerable devices as discussed in detail in Sect. V-A3.
Defense goals. The primary goal of DI¨OT is to detect
attacks on IoT devices in order to take appropriate coun-
termeasures, e.g., by preventing targeted devices from being
compromised or isolating compromised devices from the rest
of the network. We aim to detect attacks at the earliest stage
possible, preferably even before a device can be successfully
infected.
In addition, we make following assumptions:
• A1 - No malicious manufacturers. IoT devices may be
vulnerable but are not compromised when first released
by a manufacturer. Adversaries must first find a vulner-
ability and a way to exploit it, which takes some time
during which non-compromised devices generate only
legitimate communications, leaving sufficient time (cf.
Sect. VI-C) to learn benign models of device behavior.
• A2 - Security Gateway is not compromised. Since
Security Gateway is the device enforcing security in the
SOHO network, we assume that it is not compromised.
Like firewall devices or antivirus software, if Security
Gateway is compromised the SOHO network stops being
protected by it. Several approaches can be used to protect
it. For instance, if Security Gateway supports a suitable
trusted execution environment, like Intel SGX [10] or
trusted platform module, its integrity can be remotely
verified using remote attestation techniques [11].
• A3 - Automated identification of IoT devices. A
technique for automatically identifying and labeling IoT
devices in the local SOHO network must be available.
This technique should be implementable in the Security
Gateway to identify IoT devices connected to it.
C. Device-Type Identification
As DI¨OT uses device-type specific anomaly detection mod-
els, it requires the possibility to identify the type of devices
in the network. Several solutions have been designed to
automatically identify and label unknown IoT devices in a net-
work [12]–[14]. Alternatively, manufacturer-provided explicit
device-type specifications like MUD [15] or manual labeling
of IoT devices could be used. For DI¨OT, we selected an
existing approach - AuDI [14] that autonomously identifies
the type of individual IoT devices in a local network. This
approach is accurate and fast (requiring only 30 minutes to
identify device type at the accuracy of 98.2%). This approach
considers abstract device types representing families of similar
devices from the same device manufacturer with similar hard-
ware and software configurations, resulting in highly identical
communication behavior. It can be trained without the need to
manually label communication traces of pre-defined real-world
device types since it works by clustering device fingerprints so
that each cluster can be automatically labeled with an abstract
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Fig. 1: DI¨OT system model
label, e.g., type#k which represents a specific IoT device type.
It justifies our assumption A3 as mentioned above.
Using this approach we can reliably map devices to a
corresponding device type for which DI¨OT can build a device-
type-specific model of normal behavior that can be used to
effectively detect anomalous deviations. This allows DI¨OT to
be trained and operated autonomously, without the need for
human intervention at any stage.
D. Challenges
Anomaly detection techniques face challenges in the IoT
application scenario:
• C1- Dynamic threat landscape. New IoT devices are
released on a daily basis. A significant fraction of them
have security vulnerabilities. Exploits targeting vulnera-
ble devices are also being developed by adversaries at a
similarly high pace. This makes the threats against IoT
devices highly dynamic and ever-increasing.
• C2- Resource limitations. IoT devices have limited
capabilities w.r.t. available memory, computing resources
and energy often making it infeasible to perform on-
device detection.
• C3- IoT device heterogeneity and false alarms. Be-
haviors of different IoT devices are very heterogeneous,
so that anomaly detection techniques easily raise false
alarms. However, to be useful in practice, anomaly de-
tection systems must minimize false alarms.
• C4- Scarcity of communications. In contrast to high-
end devices, IoT devices generate only little traffic, often
triggered by infrequent user interactions.
E. Design Choices
1) Gateway monitoring: As on-device monitoring is rarely
feasible due to challenge C2, we perform monitoring of IoT
device communications on Security Gateway.
2) Device-type-specific anomaly detection: Since different
IoT devices can have very heterogeneous behaviors (challenge
C3), we model each device type’s behavior with a dedicated
model. Consequently, each model needs to cover only the
behavior of a specific device type. As IoT devices are typically
single-use appliances with only a few different functions, their
behavior patterns are relatively static and limited, allowing the
model to accurately capture all possible legitimate behaviors
of a device type. Thus, the model is less prone to trigger false
alarms (details in Sect. VI-D), thereby effectively addressing
challenge C3.
3) Federated learning approach: Anomaly detection mod-
els are learned using a federated learning approach where
Security Gateways use locally collected data to train local
models which IoT Security Service aggregates into a global
model (details in Sect. IV). This aggregation maximizes the
usage of limited information obtained from scarce communica-
tions at each gateway (challenge C4) and helps to improve the
accuracy of anomaly detection models by utilizing all available
data for learning.
4) Autonomous self-learning: Anomaly detection models
are trained using data autonomously labeled with the device-
type that generated it. Device types are also learned and
assigned in an autonomous manner. The whole process does
therefore not require any human intervention, which allows
DI¨OT to respond quickly and autonomously to new threats,
addressing challenge C1. It is worth noting that DI¨OT starts
operating with no anomaly detection model. It learns and
improves these models as Security Gateways aggregate more
data.
5) Modeling techniques requiring little data: As discussed
in detail in Sect. III, we select features and machine learning
algorithms (GRU) that can be efficiently trained even with few
training data. This design choice addresses challenge C4.
III. DEVICE-TYPE-SPECIFIC ANOMALY DETECTION
Our anomaly detection approach is based on evaluating the
communication patterns of a device to determine whether it is
consistent with the learned benign communication patterns of
that particular device type. The detection process is shown in
Fig. 2. In Step 1 the communication between the Security
Gateway and the IoT device is captured as a sequence of
packets pkt1, pkt2, . . .. Each packet pkt i is then in Step
2 mapped to a corresponding symbol si characterizing the
type of the packet using a mapping that is based on distinct
characteristics c1, c2, . . . , c7 derived from each packet’s header
information as discussed in Sect. III-A. The mapped sequence
of symbols s1, s2, . . . is then in Step 3 input into a pre-
trained model using Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [16],
[17]. The GRU model will calculate a probability estimate
pi for each symbol si based on the sequence of k preceding
symbols si−k, si−k+1, . . . , si−1. GRU is a novel approach to
recurrent neural networks (RNN) currently being a target of
lively research. GRUs provide similar accuracy as other RNN
approaches but are computationally less expensive [17], [18].
In Step 4 the sequence of occurrence probability estimates
p1, p2, . . . is evaluated to determine possible anomalies. If the
occurrence probabilities pi of a sufficient number of packets
in a window of consecutive packets fall below a detection
Fig. 2: Overview of device-type-specific anomaly detection
threshold, as described in detail in Sect. III-B, the packet
sequence is deemed anomalous and an alarm is raised.
A. Modelling Packet Sequences
Data packets pkt i in the packet sequence pkt1, pkt2, . . .
emitted by an IoT device are mapped into packet symbols
si based on 7-tuples (c1, c2, . . . , c7) of discrete packet char-
acteristics ci of packet pkt i. This mapping is defined by
a device-type-specific mapping function mapping type#k :
A → Btype#k s.t. mapping type#k (pkt i) = si where A is
the domain of raw network packets pkt and Btype#k is the
domain of packet symbols s for device-type type#k . Mapping
mapping type#k assigns each unique combination of packet
characteristics (c1, . . . , c7) a dedicated symbol s representing
the ’type’ of the particular packet.
We use the following packet characteristics shown also in
Tab. I:
• c1 direction: (incoming / outgoing) Normal TCP traffic is
usually balanced two-way communication but abnormal
is not as, e.g., a bot only sends packets to a victim without
receiving replies when running DDoS attacks.
• c2 and c3 local and remote port type: (system / user
/ dynamic) Each device-type uses specific ports designed
by the manufacturers while malicious attack patterns
usually use different ports.
• c4 packet length: (bin index of packet’s length where
eight most frequently occurring packet lengths receive
dedicated bins and one bin for other packet length values)
Each device-type communicates using specific packet
patterns with specific packet lengths that are mostly
different in malicious attack patterns.
• c5 TCP flags: Normal communications contain pack-
ets with specific TCP flag sequences e.g., SY N →
SY NACK → ACK → PUSH → FIN . However,
many attacks do not follow standard protocols, e.g., SYN
flood (DDoS attack) only sends SY N messages.
• c6 encapsulated protocol types: Each device type usu-
ally uses a set of specific protocols, which is likely
different from protocol types used in attacks.
• c7 IAT bin: (bin index of packet inter-arrival time (IAT)
using three bins: < 0.001ms, 0.001ms to 0.05ms, and
> 0.05ms) Many attacks (e.g., DDoS) usually generate
traffic at a high packet rate, resulting in smaller IAT
values in than normal communications.
TABLE I: Packet characteristics used in symbol mapping
ID Characteristic Value
c1 direction 1 = incoming, 0 = outgoing
c2 local port type bin index of port type
c3 remote port type bin index of port type
c4 packet length bin index of packet length
c5 TCP flags TCP flag values
c6 protocols encapsulated protocol types
c7 IAT bin bin index of packet inter-arrival time
B. Detection Process
Fig. 3a shows an example of the occurrence frequencies of
individual packet symbols for benign and attack traffic (as
generated by the Mirai malware) for Edimax smart power
plugs. It can be seen that using packet symbols alone to
distinguish between benign and attack traffic is not sufficient,
as both traffic types contain packet types that are mapped to
the same symbols. Our detection approach is therefore based
on estimating the likelihood of observing individual packet
types given the sequence of preceding packets. The rationale
behind this approach is the observation that IoT device com-
munications usually follow particular characteristic patterns.
Traffic generated by IoT malware, however, doesn’t follow
these patterns and can therefore be detected. We will thus use
the detection model to calculate an occurrence probability pi
for each packet symbol si given the sequence of k preceding
symbols < si−k, si−k+1, . . . , si−1 >, i.e.,
pi = P (si| < si−k, si−k+1, . . . , si−1 >) (1)
Parameter k is a property of the used GRU network and
denotes the length of the lookback history, i.e., the number
of preceding symbols that the GRU takes into account when
calculating the probability estimate. From Fig. 3b we can
see that these probability estimates are on average higher for
packets belonging to benign traffic patterns, and lower for
packets generated by malware on an infected device and can
therefore be flagged as anomalous.
Definition 1 (Anomalous packets): Packet pkt i mapped to
packet symbol si is anomalous, if its occurrence probability
pi is below detection threshold δ, i.e., if
pi < δ (2)
We performed an extensive empirical analysis of the proba-
bility estimates provided by device-specific detection models
for both benign and attack traffic for the datasets described
in Sect. VI and could determine that a value of δ = 10−2
provides a good separation between benign and attack traffic,
(a) Symbol distribution
(b) Probability distribution
Fig. 3: Packet symbol occurrence frequencies and occurrence
probability estimates for benign and attack traffic for Edimax
smart power plugs
Fig. 4: Occurrence probabilities of 15 packets from Edimax
Plug when Mirai was in standby stage. The red ’#0’ denotes
the malicious packets.
as can be also seen in Fig. 3b. An example of our approach
is shown in Fig. 4. Malicious packets (represented by symbol
’#0’) get very low probability estimates (<10−4), distinguish-
ing them clearly from benign packets. However, their presence
at indices 6− 7 also affects the estimate of the benign packet
’#41’ at index 8 (<10−6), since the sequence of packets
preceding this packet is unknown to the detection model.
Triggering an anomaly each time an anomalous packet is
observed would lead to numerous false positive detections,
as also benign traffic may contain noise that is not covered
by the GRU model and will therefore receive low occurrence
probability estimates. An anomaly is therefore triggered only
in the case that a significant number of packets in a window
of consecutive packets are anomalous.
Fig. 5: Overview of federated learning process
Definition 2 (Anomaly triggering condition): Given a win-
dow W of w consecutive packets W = (pkt1, pkt2, . . . , pktw)
represented by symbol sequence S = (s1, s2, . . . sw), we
trigger an anomaly alarm, if the fraction of anomalous packets
in W is larger than an anomaly triggering threshold γ, i.e., if
|{si ∈ S|pi < δ}|
w
> γ (3)
IV. FEDERATED LEARNING APPROACH
The GRU models are learned using traffic collected at sev-
eral Security Gateways, each monitoring a client IoT network.
Each Security Gateway observing a device of a particular type
type#k contributes to training its anomaly detection model.
We take a federated learning approach to implement the
distributed learning of models from several clients. Federated
learning is a communication-efficient and privacy-preserving
learning approach suited for distributed optimization of Deep
Neural Networks (DNN) [19], [20]. In federated learning,
clients do not share their training data but rather train a local
model and send model updates to a centralized entity which
aggregates them. Federated learning is chosen because it is
suitable [21] for scenarios where:
• data are massively distributed, so that there is a large
number of clients each having a small amount of data.
IoT devices typically generate little traffic, which means
only little data can be provided by each client alone.
• contributions from clients are imbalanced. In our system,
the training data available at each Security Gateway
depends on the duration that an IoT device has been in the
network and the amount of interaction it has had, which
varies largely between clients.
A. Learning Process
The federated training process is illustrated in Fig. 5. Each
Security Gateway having devices of a particular type type#k
in its network requests a detection profile for this type from
IoT Security Service in Step 1 and gets an initial GRU model
for this type in Step 2. At the start of DI¨OT, this model is
random, otherwise it is already trained through several rounds
of the following process. In Step 3 the global model is re-
trained locally by each Security Gateway with traces collected
by monitoring communication of the type#k devices. Then
in Step 4 local updates made to the model by each Security
Gateway are reported to IoT Security Service which in Step
5 aggregates them as defined in Def.3 [21] to improve the
global model. Finally, the updated global model for type#k
devices is then pushed back to Security Gateway and used for
anomaly detection (Step 6). The re-training of the model is
performed on a regular basis to improve its accuracy.
Definition 3 (Global Model Aggregation): Given n clients
with their associated model weights W1, . . . ,Wn trained by
associated number of data samples s1, . . . , sn. We define the
global model G which is aggregated from those local models
as follows:
G =
n∑
i=1
si
s
Wi (where s =
n∑
i=1
si) (4)
To train our models we adopt an approach introduced by
McMahan et al. [21]. Each client (Security Gateway) trains
its GRU model locally for several epochs before reporting
updates to IoT Security Service. This limits the communication
overhead by reducing the number of updates to send to the
IoT Security Service. To the best of our knowledge we are
the first to employ a federated learning approach for anomaly
detection-based intrusion detection.
B. Federated Learning Setup
We implemented the federated learning algorithm utilizing
the flask [22] and flask socketio [23] libraries for the server-
side application and the socketIO-client [24] library for the
client-side application. The socketIO-client uses the gevent
asynchronous framework [25] which provides a clean API
for concurrency and network related tasks. We used the
Keras [26] library with Tensorflow backend to implement the
GRU network with the parameters selected in Sect. V-B.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To evaluate DI¨OT, we apply it on the use case of detecting
real-life IoT malware. We selected Mirai for this purpose,
since its source code is publicly available and several infamous
malware variants like Hajime [2] or Persirai [27] have been
implemented using the same code base. Mirai also realizes
similar attack stages (detailed in Sect. V-A3 below) as state-
of-the-art IoT malware [3], [28]. This makes Mirai a highly
relevant baseline for IoT malware behavior.
A. Datasets
We collected extensive datasets about the communication
behavior of IoT devices in laboratory and real-world deploy-
ment settings. The monitored devices included 33 typical
consumer IoT devices like IP cameras, smart power plugs and
light bulbs, sensors, etc. The devices were mapped by our
device-type-identification method to 23 unique device types.
The detailed list of devices and assignment to device-types
can be found in Tab. II. We collected datasets by setting up
IoT device vendor cloud service
IoT device
IoT device
IoT device
Internet
IoT device
Laboratory network
Security Gateway
tcpdump
Experimentation 
GUI
Attack Server
VirtualBox
C&C Loader Listenerhostapd
Fig. 6: Laboratory network setup
a laboratory network as shown in Fig. 6 using hostapd on
a laptop running Kali Linux to create a gateway acting as
an access point with WiFi and Ethernet interfaces to which
IoT devices were connected. On the gateway we collected all
network traffic packets originating from the monitored devices
using tcpdump.
1) Activity dataset: A key characteristic of IoT devices is
that they expose only a few distinct actions accessible to users,
e.g., ON, OFF, ADJUST, etc. To capture the communication
patterns related to user interactions with IoT devices, we
collected a dataset encompassing all such actions being in-
voked on the respective IoT devices. We repeatedly performed
actions shown in Tab. IV. Each of the actions was repeated
20 times (20-time repetition chosen as a rule of thumb). To
capture also less intensive usage patterns, the dataset was
augmented with longer measurements of two to three hours,
during which actions were triggered only occasionally. This
dataset contains data from 33 IoT devices out of which 27
have both action and standby data. Six devices (lighting and
home automation hubs) have standby data only because they
do not provide meaningful actions that users could invoke.
2) Deployment dataset: To evaluate DI¨OT in a realistic
smart home deployment setting, in particular with regard to
how many false alarms it will raise, we installed a number of
(n = 14) different smart home IoT devices1 in several different
domestic deployment scenarios. This deployment involved real
users and collected communication traces of these devices
under realistic usage conditions. We used the same set-up as
in the laboratory network for the domestic deployment, albeit
we excluded the attack server. Users used and interacted with
the IoT devices as part of their everyday life. Packet traces
were collected continuously during one week.
3) Attack dataset: For evaluating the effectiveness of DI¨OT
at detecting attacks, we collected a dataset comprising mali-
cious traffic of IoT devices infected with Mirai malware [1],
[3] in all four different attack stages discussed below: pre-
infection, infection, scanning and DoS attacks (as a monetiza-
tion stage). Additionally, we collected traffic when Mirai was
in a standby mode, i.e., not performing any attack but awaiting
commands from its Command & Control server.
1The number of devices was limited, as the driver of the used WiFi interface
allowed at most 16 devices to reliably connect to it simultaneously.
TABLE II: 33 IoT devices used in the Activity, Deployment and Attack datasets and their connectivity technologies + Affectation
of these devices to 23 DI¨OT device types during evaluation.
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type#01 ApexisCam Apexis IP Camera APM-J011 • • ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#02 CamHi Cooau Megapixel IP Camera • • ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#03 D-LinkCamDCH935L D-Link HD IP Camera DCH-935L • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#04 D-LinkCamDCS930L D-Link WiFi Day Camera DCS-930L • • ◦ • • •D-LinkCamDCS932L D-Link WiFi Camera DCS-932L • • ◦ • • •
D-LinkDoorSensor D-Link Door & Window sensor ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦
D-LinkSensor D-Link WiFi Motion sensor DCH-S150 • ◦ ◦ • • ◦
type#05 D-LinkSiren D-Link Siren DCH-S220 • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
D-LinkSwitch D-Link Smart plug DSP-W215 • ◦ ◦ • • ◦
D-LinkWaterSensor D-Link Water sensor DCH-S160 • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#06 EdimaxCamIC3115 Edimax IC-3115W Smart HD WiFi Network Camera • • ◦ • ◦ ◦EdimaxCamIC3115(2) Edimax IC-3115W Smart HD WiFi Network Camera • • ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#07 EdimaxPlug1101W Edimax SP-1101W Smart Plug Switch • • ◦ • • •EdimaxPlug2101W Edimax SP-2101W Smart Plug Switch • ◦ ◦ • • •
type#08 EdnetCam Ednet Wireless indoor IP camera Cube • • ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#09 EdnetGateway Ednet.living Starter kit power Gateway • ◦ • • • ◦
type#10 HomeMaticPlug Homematic pluggable switch HMIP-PS ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦
type#11 Lightify Osram Lightify Gateway • ◦ • • • ◦
type#12 SmcRouter SMC router SMCWBR14S-N4 EU • • ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#13 TP-LinkPlugHS100 TP-Link WiFi Smart plug HS100 • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦TP-LinkPlugHS110 TP-Link WiFi Smart plug HS110 • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#14 UbnTAirRouter Ubnt airRouter HP • • ◦ • ◦ •
type#15 WansviewCam Wansview 720p HD Wireless IP Camera K2 • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#16 WeMoLink WeMo Link Lighting Bridge model F7C031vf • ◦ • • ◦ ◦
type#17 WeMoInsightSwitch WeMo Insight Switch model F7C029de • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦WeMoSwitch WeMo Switch model F7C027de • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#18 HueSwitch Philips Hue Light Switch PTM 215Z ◦ ◦ • • • ◦
type#19 AmazonEcho Amazon Echo • ◦ ◦ • • ◦
type#20 AmazonEchoDot Amazon Echo Dot • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
type#21 GoogleHome Google Home • ◦ ◦ • • ◦
type#22 Netatmo Netatmo weather station with wind gauge • ◦ • • • ◦
type#23 iKettle2 Smarter iKettle 2.0 water kettle SMK20-EU • ◦ ◦ • • ◦SmarterCoffee Smarter SmarterCoffee coffee machine SMC10-EU • ◦ ◦ • • ◦
TABLE III: Characteristics of used datasets
Dataset
(Number of devices)
Time
(hours)
Size
(MiB) Flows Packets
Activity (33) 165 465 115,951 2,087,280
Deployment (14) 2,352 578 95,518 2,286,697
Attack (5) 84 7,734 8,464,434 21,919,273
TABLE IV: Actions for different IoT device categories
Category (count) Typical actions
IP cameras (6) START / STOP video, adjust settings, reboot
Smart plugs (9) ON, OFF, meter reading
Sensors (3) trigger sensing action
Smart lights (4) turn ON, turn OFF, adjust brightness
Actuators (1) turn ON, turn OFF
Appliances (2) turn ON, turn OFF, adjust settings
Routers (2) browse amazon.com
Hub devices (6) no actions
Among 33 experimental devices, we found 5 devices which
are vulnerable to the Mirai malware. The Attack dataset
was collected from those five devices: D-LinkCamDCS930L,
D-LinkCamDCS932L, EdimaxPlug1101W, EdimaxPlug2101W
and UbntAirRouter. This was done by installing the Com-
mand & Control, Loader and Listener server modules on
the laboratory network for infecting target devices with Mirai
and controlling them. Infection was achieved using security
vulnerabilities like easy-to-guess default passwords to open
a terminal session to the device and issuing appropriate
commands to download the malware binary onto the device.
In the pre-infection stage, Loader sends a set of commands
via telnet to the vulnerable IoT device to prepare its envi-
ronment and identify an appropriate method for uploading
the Mirai binary files. We repeated the pre-infection process
50 times for each device. During each run, around 900 pre-
infection-related packets were generated.
After pre-infection the infection stage commences, during
which Loader uploads Mirai binary files to the IoT device. It
supports three upload methods: wget, tftp and echo (in
this priority order). To infect the two D-Link cameras and the
Ubnt router Loader uses wget, on the Edimax plugs it will
resort to using tftp as these are installed on the devices by
default. We repeated the infection process 50 times for each
device, each run generating approximately 700 data packets.
In the scanning stage we collected packets while the in-
fected devices were actively performing a network scan in
order to locate other vulnerable devices. Data collection was
performed for five minutes per device, resulting in a dataset
of more than 446,000 scanning data packets.
We extensively tested the DoS attack stage, utilizing all ten
different DoS attack vectors (for details, see [29]) available in
the Mirai source code [30]. We ran all attacks separately on
all five compromised devices for five minutes each, generating
more than 20 million packets of attack traffic in total.
Tab. III summarizes the sizes and numbers of distinct
packets and packet flows in the different datasets. While packet
flows can’t be directly mapped to distinct device actions, they
do provide a rough estimate of the overall level of activity of
the targeted devices in the dataset.
B. Parameter Selection
Based on initial experiments with our datasets (Tab. III) we
inferred that a lookback history of k = 20 symbols is sufficient
to capture most communication interactions with sufficient
accuracy. We used a GRU network with three hidden layers of
size 128 neurons each. The size of the input and output layers
is device-type-specific and equal to the number of mapping
symbols of the function mapping type#k , which is equal to
| Btype#k | (cf. Sect. III-A). We learned 23 anomaly detection
models, each corresponding to a device type identified using
the method described in Sect. II-C. Each anomaly detection
model was trained with, and respectively tested on, commu-
nication from all devices matching the considered type.
C. Evaluation Metrics
We use false positive and true positive rate (FPR and TPR)
as measures of fitness. FPR measures the rate at which benign
communication is incorrectly classified as anomalous by our
method causing a false alarm to be raised. TPR is the rate at
which attacks are correctly reported as anomalous. We seek
to minimize FPR, since otherwise the system easily becomes
unusable, as the user would be overwhelmed with false alarms.
At the same time we want to maximize TPR so that as many
attacks as possible will be detected by our approach.
Testing for false positives was performed by four-fold cross-
validation for device types in the Activity and Deployment
datasets. The data were divided equally into four folds using
three folds for training and one for testing. To determine the
FPR, we divided the testing dataset according to Def. 2 into
windows of w = 250 packets. Since the testing data contained
only benign communications, any triggered anomaly alarm for
packets of the window indicated it as a false positive, whereas
windows without alarms were considered a true negative.
Testing for true positives was done by using the Activity and
Deployment datasets as training data and the Attack dataset
for testing with the same settings as for false positive testing.
Moreover, as we know that the Attack dataset also contains
benign traffic corresponding to normal operations of the IoT
devices, we were interested in the average duration until
detection. Therefore, in each window of w = 250 packets we
calculated the number of packets required until an anomaly
alarm was triggered in order to estimate the average detection
time. In terms of TPR, such windows were considered true
positives, whereas windows without triggered alarms were
considered false negatives.
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Fig. 7: ROC curve of TPR and FPR in dependence of detection
threshold δ and anomaly triggering threshold γ.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Accuracy
To determine appropriate values for the detection threshold
δ and anomaly triggering threshold γ, we evaluated FPR using
the Activity (33 devices, 23 device types) dataset and TPR
using the Attack (5 devices, 3 device types) dataset for a fixed
window size of w = 250. Fig. 7 shows the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve of FPR and TPR in dependence
of these parameters. We can see that all curves quickly reach
over 0.9 TPR while keeping a very low FPR (<0.01), which
is one of the main objectives for our approach. We therefore
select δ = 0.01 and γ = 0.5 at w = 250, which achieves
94.01% TPR at <0.01 FPR.
Using these selected parameters in the Deployment (14
devices, 10 device types) dataset and Attack (5 devices) dataset,
we achieved an attack detection rate of 95.60% TPR and
no false positives, i.e., 0% FPR during one week of evalua-
tion. These results show that DI¨OT can successfully address
challenge C3, reporting no false alarms in a real-world
deployment setting. Tab. V shows the detailed performance
of our system for different attack scenarios (cf. Sect. V). The
time to detect attacks varies according to the traffic intensity
of the attacks. The average detection delay over all tested
attacks is 257 ± 194 ms. DI¨OT can detect an attack in the
pre-infection stage after 223 packets while Mirai generates
more than 900 packets during pre-infection. It means DI¨OT
is able to detect the attack even before the attack proceeds to
the infection stage.
The detection rate for DoS attacks is lower than for other
attack stages. However, all DoS attacks are eventually detected
because DoS attacks have a high throughput (1, 412.94 pack-
ets/s.) and we analyze five windows of 250 packets per second
at this rate. Considering the 88.96% TPR we achieve on DoS
attacks, four windows out of five are detected as anomalous
and trigger an alarm. It is also worth noting that infected
devices in standby mode get detected in 33.33% of cases,
while this activity is very stealthy (0.05 packets/s).
TABLE V: Average detection times of analyzed Mirai attacks
Attack packets/s. det. time (ms.) TPR
standby 0.05 4,051,889 33.33%
Pre-Infection 426.66 524 100.00%
Infection 721.18 272 93.45%
Scanning 752.60 166 100.00%
DoS 1,412.94 92 88.96%
Average 866.88 257±194 95.60%
Fig. 8: Evolution of TPR and FPR as we increase the number
of clients in federated learning. TPR decreases slightly (-3%)
while FPR reaches 0 (-21%) when using 15 clients.
B. Efficiency of Federated Learning
We conducted a set of experiments to evaluate federated
learning performance with different numbers of clients (rang-
ing from 2 to 15) contributing to the training of the models. We
selected the number of epochs that each client trains its local
model to be 17 and specified the number of communication
rounds between clients and server to be 3. Therefore, the local
models were trained a total of 51 epochs. This was deemed
sufficient since in our initial experiments utilizing a centralized
learning setting the models converged after approximately 50
epochs. Each client was allocated a randomized subset of
training data from the Deployment dataset (ranging from 0.1%
to 10% of the total training dataset size) and we evaluated
the system’s performance for different numbers of clients
involved in building the federated model. In average, each
client takes approximately one second to train one local epoch
on its data. We repeated our experiment three times for each
device type, with random re-sampling of the training datasets.
As expected, Fig. 8 shows that the federated models with
more participating clients achieve better FPR, while TPR
deteriorates only slightly.
Federated learning provides better privacy for clients con-
tributing to training as they do not need to share their training
data. However, this may result in a loss of accuracy of the
obtained model in comparison to training the model in a
centralized manner. To evaluate this possible loss in accuracy,
we trained three federated models using the entire training
dataset by dividing it among 5, 9 or 15 clients and comparing
these to a model trained in a centralized manner. Tab. VI shows
a small decrease in TPR as we increase the number of clients
TABLE VI: Effect of using federated learning comparing to
centralizing approach
Type Centralizedlearning
Federated learning
5 clients 9 clients 15 clients
FPR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TPR 95.60% 95.43% 95.01% 94.07%
Fig. 9: Effect of training data size in time to FPR
while FPR is not deteriorated (remaining constant at 0.00%).
This small drop in TPR is not a concern since a large number
of packet windows would still trigger an alarm for any attack
stage.
C. Data Needed for Training
Fig. 9 shows an example of detection model performance
for two Edimax smart plug devices (models 1101W & 2101W)
in dependency of the amount of data used for training the
model. We divided the 7-day Deployment dataset into one-
hour data chunks and randomly sampled different amounts of
data chunks for training the model, gradually increasing the
training dataset size. The figure shows that the FPR decreases
noticeably when the training dataset grows. More importantly,
the model needs less than 25 hours of data to achieve FPR = 0.
It shows that our detection model needs little data for training
and it means DI¨OT can address challenge C4. Moreover, with
the help of our federated learning approach leveraging several
clients contributing to training the model, each client needs
only a small amount of data i.e, 2.5 hours if there are ten
clients involved. It justifies our assumption A1 as mentioned
in Sect. II-B.
D. Efficiency of Device-Type-Specific Models and Scalability
Traditional anomaly detection approaches utilizing a sin-
gle model for modeling benign behavior easily suffer from
increasing false positive rates or decreasing sensitivity when
the number of different types of behaviors (i.e., device types)
captured by the model grows. This makes them unsuitable
for real-world deployments with hundreds or thousands of
different device types. Our solution, however, does not have
this drawback, as it uses a dedicated detection model for each
device type (details in Sect. III). Each of these models focuses
solely on the characteristic behavior of one single device type,
resulting in more specific and accurate behavioral models,
independent of the number of different device types handled
by the system. To evaluate the benefit of using device-type-
specific anomaly detection models compared to using a single
model for all devices, we evaluated a single model on the
whole Deployment dataset using 4-fold-cross validation and
evaluated detection accuracy on the Attack dataset. The result
is as expected: FPR increases from 0% to 0.67% while TPR
increases from 95.6% to 97.21%. However, as mentioned in
Sect. II, a high false alarm rate would make the anomaly
detection system impractical. If the system had FPR of 0.67%
in our deployment setup, it would trigger around eight alarms
per day. It means a smarthome with dozens of devices could
have hundreds of false alarms per day.
E. Performance
We evaluated the processing performance of GRU without
specific performance optimizations on a laptop and a desk-
top computer. The laptop ran Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with an
Intel©Core™i7-4600 CPU with 8GB of memory, whereas the
desktop ran Ubuntu Linux 18.04 with an Intel©Core™i7-
7700 CPU with 8GB of memory and a Radeon RX 460 core
graphic card. We evaluated the processing performance of
GRU without specific optimizations on a laptop and a desktop
computer. The laptop ran Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with an Intel
i7-4600 CPU with 8GB of memory, whereas the desktop ran
Ubuntu Linux 18.04 with an Intel i7-7700 CPU with 8GB of
memory and a Radeon RX 460 core graphics card with GPU.
Average processing time per symbol (packet) for prediction
was 0.081(±0.001) ms for the desktop utilizing its GPU and
0.592(±0.001) ms when executed on the laptop with CPU. On
average, training a GRU model for one device type took 26
minutes on the desktop and 71 minutes on the laptop hardware
when considering a week’s worth of data in the Deployment
dataset. We conclude from this that model training will be
feasible to realize in real deployment scenarios, as training
will in any case be done gradually as data are collected from
the network over longer periods of time.
VII. EFFECTIVENESS
A. Generalizability of Anomaly Detection
Although we focused our evaluation on the most well-
known IoT malware so far: Mirai [1] for the use case, DI¨OT
is likely effective also in detecting other botnet malware
like Persirai [27], Hajime [2], etc. DI¨OT’s anomaly detection
leverages deviations in the behavior of infected IoT devices
caused by the malware. Such deviations will be observable
for any malware.
B. Evolution of IoT Device Behavior
The behavior of an IoT device type can evolve due to,
e.g., firmware updates that bring new functionality. This mod-
ifies its behavior and may trigger false alarms for legitimate
communication. We prevent these false alarms by correlating
anomaly reports from all Security Gateways at the IoT Security
Service. Assuming firmware updates would be propagated to
many client networks in a short time, if alarms are reported
from a large number of security gateways for the same device
type in a short time, we can cancel the alarm and trigger
re-learning of the corresponding device identification and
anomaly detection models to adapt to this new behavior. To
ensure that sudden widespread outbreaks of an IoT malware
infection campaign are not erroneously interpreted as firmware
updates, the canceling of an alarm can be confirmed by a
human expert at the IoT Security Service. This should represent
a small burden, as the roll-out of firmware updates is a
relatively seldom event.
C. Mimicking Legitimate Communication
An adversary that has compromised an IoT device can
attempt to mimic the device’s legitimate communication pat-
terns to try to remain undetected. However, as the device-
type-specific detection model is restricted to the (relatively
limited) functionality of the IoT device, it is in practice very
difficult for the adversary to mimic legitimate communication
and at the same time achieve a malicious purpose, e.g.,
scanning, flooding, etc., especially when considering that any
change in packet flow semantics is also likely to change the
characteristics (protocol, packet size, port, etc.) of packets and
their ordering, which are both used for detecting anomalies
in the packet sequence. Moreover, adversaries would need
to know the device-type-specific communication patterns in
order to mimic them. This makes it significantly harder for
adversaries to develop large scale IoT malware that affects a
wide range of different IoT device types in the way that, e.g.,
Mirai does.
D. Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial examples. If an adversary manages to compro-
mise an IoT device while remaining undetected, it can attempt
to ’poison’ the training process of the system by forging pack-
ets as adversarial examples that are specifically meant to in-
fluence the learning of the model in such a way that malicious
activities are not detected by it. There exist techniques to forge
adversarial examples to neural networks [31]. However, these
apply to images [32], [33] and audio inputs [34], [35], where
objective functions for the underlying optimization problem
are easy to define. Forging adversarial examples consists of
finding minimal modifications  for an input x of class C such
that x+ is classified as C ′ 6= C. For example, in our case this
would mean that a malicious packet is incorrectly classified
as a benign one. In contrast to image or audio processing,
however, our features (symbols) are not raw but processed
from packet properties. First, it means that modifications
 are computed for our symbolic representation of packet
sequences which are difficult to realize in a way that would
preserve their utility for the adversary, i.e., realize ’useful’
adversarial functionality required for malicious activities like
scanning or DoS. Second, it is difficult to define the objective
distance to minimize in order to achieve “small modifications”
since modifying the value of one single packet characteristic
(protocol, port, etc.) can change the semantics of a packet
entirely.
Poisoning federated learning. For initial model training,
we can assume the training data contain only legitimate
network traffic, as devices are assumed initially to be benign
(assumption A1 (Sect. II-B)). However, the federated setting
can be subject to poisoning attacks during re-training, where
the adversary uses adversarial examples as described above to
corrupt the anomaly detection model so that it eventually will
accept malicious traffic as benign [36] (or vice versa). Tech-
niques have been developed for preventing poisoning attacks
by using local outlier detection-based filtering of adversarial
examples to pre-empt model poisoning [37].
In the scope of this paper we assume that the Security
Gateway is not compromised by the adversary (assumption
A2 (Sect. II-B)). However, since a malicious user can have
physical access to his Security Gateway, it is thinkable that
he could compromise it in order to stage a poisoning attack
against the system using adversarial examples. In this case,
local filtering of adversarial examples is not possible, as it can
not be enforced by the compromised Security Gateway. We are
therefore currently focusing our ongoing research efforts on
applying poisoning mitigation approaches applied at the IoT
Security Service. These include using more robust learning
approaches less resilient to adversarial examples that will
’average out’ the effects of adversarial examples, as well as
approaches similar to, e.g., Shen et al. [38], where malicious
model updates are detected before they are incorporated in
global detection models.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Several solutions have been proposed for the detection
and prevention of intrusions in IoT networks [39], [40],
sensor networks [9] and industrial control systems [41], [42].
SVELTE [40] is an intrusion detection system for protecting
IoT networks from already known attacks. It adapts existing
intrusion detection techniques to IoT-specific protocols, e.g.,
6LoWPAN. Similarly, Doshi at al. [6] proposed a signature-
based approach to detect known DDoS attacks using features
representing the density of the network traffic. In contrast,
DI¨OT performs dynamic detection of any unknown attacks
that deviate from the legitimate behavior of the device, since
it only models legitimate network traffic. Jia et al. [39] pro-
posed a context-based system to automatically detect sensitive
actions in IoT platforms. This system is designed for patching
vulnerabilities in appified IoT platforms such as Samsung
SmartThings. It is not applicable to multi-vendor IoT systems
while DI¨OT is platform independent.
Detecting anomalies in network traffic has a long history [7],
[8], [43], [44]. Existing approaches rely on analysing single
network packets [7] or clustering large numbers of packets [8],
[9] to detected intrusions or compromised services. Some
works have proposed, as we do, to model communication as a
language [42], [43]. For instance, authors of [43] derive finite
state automatons from layer 3-4 communication protocol spec-
ifications. Monitored packets are processed by the automaton
to detect deviations from protocol specification or abnormally
high usage of specific transitions. Automatons can only model
short sequences of packets while we use GRU to model longer
sequences, which enables the detection of stealthy attacks.
Also, modelling protocol specifications is coarse and leaves
room for circumventing detection. In contrast, we use finer
grained-features that are difficult to forge while preserving the
adversarial utility of malicious packets.
Lately, recurrent neural networks (RNN) have been used
for several anomaly-detection purposes. Most applications
leverage Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks for
detecting anomalies in time series [45], aircraft data [46] or
system logs [47]. Oprea at al. [48] use deep belief networks
for mining DNS log data and detect infections in enterprise
networks. In contrast to these works, DI¨OT uses a different
flavor of RNN, namely GRU that can be learned using less
training data, enabling DI¨OT to be trained faster, and operate
in real-time, detecting anomalies in live network traffic instead
of utilizing off-line analysis.
IX. SUMMARY
In this paper we introduced DI¨OT: a self-learning system
for detecting compromised devices in IoT networks. Our
solution relies on novel automated techniques for device-type-
specific anomaly detection. DI¨OT does not require any human
intervention or labeled data to operate. It learns anomaly
detection models autonomously, using unlabeled crowdsourced
data captured in client IoT networks. We demonstrated the effi-
cacy of anomaly detection in detecting a large set of malicious
behavior from devices infected by the Mirai malware. DI¨OT
detected 95.6% of attacks in 257 milliseconds on average and
without raising any false alarm when evaluated in a real-world
deployment.
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